

VZCZCXRO1553  
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO  
DE RUEHDS #2185/01 1940818  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
P 130818Z JUL 07  
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6970  
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0685  
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY 0377  
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0017  
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU PRIORITY 0217  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002185

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E  
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER  
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [MOPS](#) [KPKO](#) [SO](#) [ET](#) [ER](#) [AU](#) [BN](#)  
SUBJECT: SOMALI TFG AMBASSADOR REVIEWS SOMALILAND, AMISOM,  
AND RECONCILIATION PROCESS

REF: ADDIS ABABA 1507 (NOTAL)

Classified By: ERIC WONG, ACTING DCM. REASON: 1.4 (D).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. According to Ambassador Abdulkarim Farah, the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia's (TFG) Ambassador to Ethiopia and PermRep to the African Union, African foreign ministers meeting in Accra unanimously rejected a Ghanaian motion to establish an AU committee to examine Somaliland issues. Kenya, as IGAD chair, objected to such a proposal being raised before the AU Council of Ministers, prior to being discussed at the sub-regional level. Citing sanctions on Eritrea for unpaid arrears, ministers also denied the Eritrean foreign minister the right to address the Council, when he attempted to castigate Ethiopia and the United States for "destroying" Somalia. Stating that Ethiopia needed to withdraw troops soon from Somalia, Amb. Farah said Benin was ready to contribute two battalions to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and that Nigeria had provided USD 2 million to AMISOM. The TFG will propose that the AU PSC endorse a six-month extension of AMISOM's mandate to December 2006. On the political front, Farah asserted that Somalia's long-anticipated National Reconciliation Conference would begin July 15, albeit "slowly," but criticized TFG leadership for disproportionate appointments of ethnic Darood and weak commitment to transition in 2009. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) On July 7, visiting AF DAS James Swan, accompanied by Ambassador and A/DCM, met with TFG Ambassador Abdulkarim Farah. Farah had just returned from the semi-annual AU Summit in Accra, and was due to travel with TFG Prime Minister Ghedi to Jeddah for a visit with Saudi King Abdullah. According to Farah, Ghedi would seek direct financial assistance for the TFG from Saudi Arabia; Riyadh's previous interest in hosting a meeting on Somali reconciliation, and its engagement of Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) representatives, were other possible topics. Commenting on the AU Summit, Farah said that while Senegalese President Wade had backed Libya's Qadhafi, South African President Mbeki had joined with Ethiopian PM Meles and Ugandan President Museveni to urge a slow approach to African political integration; the compromise declaration adopted

highlighted the need for economic harmonization, with political integration as an ultimate goal, Farah said.

-----  
MINISTERS REJECT SOMALILAND MOTION; REBUT ERITREA  
-----

¶3. (C) Amb. Farah reviewed discussions on Somalia among the AU Council of Ministers in Accra. At the conclusion of prolonged deliberations on unrelated topics, the Ghanaian Foreign Minister had unexpectedly introduced a motion to establish a ministerial committee to examine Somaliland issues and to report to the next AU Summit in January 2008, Farah said. Farah had objected, observing that while peace in Somaliland was encouraging, establishing such a committee risked setting a precedent for Puntland, Jubaland, and possible future entities, while challenging Somalia's sovereignty. As Somalia's Transitional Charter had called for a weak federal government and strong regional government, Somaliland could be an entity in accordance with such an arrangement.

¶4. (C) Farah said AU ministers unanimously opposed Ghana's pro-Somaliland motion. South Africa had supported the TFG's objection, noting that Somaliland had hired a consulting firm that the South African government had accused of organizing secessionist meetings. Kenya, as chair of IGAD, had argued that the issue should be raised first at the regional level, prior to the AU Council of Ministers, and that the motion risked "sabotaging" the TFG. Even Egypt had argued for respecting Somalia's sovereignty, Farah said.

¶5. (C) According to Farah, the only reference to the United

ADDIS ABAB 00002185 002 OF 003

States arose when Eritrea's Foreign Minister had complained at the AU ministerial that Ethiopia and the United States were "destroying the life of Somalia." The Eritrean FM was then denied the floor, when AU legal advisors agreed with Farah's point of order that Eritrea was under sanction (due to arrears), and therefore should not be recognized. Farah had responded that there was not a single U.S. soldier in Somalia, and that only Eritrea was destabilizing the country, by shipping arms to Somalia and by harboring terrorists. Somalia was participating in the global war on terrorism, while Eritrea was providing safehaven. Ethiopian FM Seyoum had also rebutted Eritrea, Farah added.

-----  
BENIN, BURUNDI, NIGERIA AMONG TCCS FOR AMISOM  
-----

¶6. (C) The TFG did not seek to discuss extending AMISOM's mandate at the recently concluded AU Summit, Farah said. Instead, Farah said he planned to propose to Nigeria (holding the monthly chair of the AU Peace and Security Council) that the AU PSC endorse a six-month extension of AMISOM's mandate to December 2006. TFG PM Ghedi had sought only a two-month extension, assuming that a July 18 UNSC meeting on Somalia indicated the UN would soon assume control of the operation. Citing the recent UNSC PRST, Swan said the USG had consistently called for UN planning on Somalia, but agreed that two months was too short for the UN to assume control: logistical and administrative preparations, identification of TCCs for a force that UN DPKO has indicated would number approximately 20,000 troops, and a UNSCR mandate for a UN operation would be needed. Moreover, a short extension of AMISOM, particularly if coupled with another postponement of the National Reconciliation Congress, could signal lack of progress in Somalia.

¶7. (C) Ethiopian troops now needed to withdraw from Somalia, Farah said. Potential troop-contributing countries (TCCs) for AMISOM included Benin, Burundi, Ghana, and Nigeria, who had no objection to immediate deployment. According to Farah, Benin had complained that the TFG had not consulted

its government earlier, but was now ready to deploy two battalions after completing final training. (COMMENT: We have not heard previously of this purported commitment from Benin and are verifying Farah's report. END COMMENT.) Burundi only awaited logistics support and equipment (some of which had been provided by France) to deploy French-trained troops, and could deploy within two weeks, if provided strategic lift. Nigeria's president had said his defense minister would approve deployment, but was awaiting the formation of a new government; Nigeria had also provided USD 2 million to the AU to support AMISOM.

18. (C) Swan noted that the USG has some funding available for equipping TCCs. Deploying AMISOM or even UN troops alone--whQe important--would be insufficient to assure security in Somalia, Swan added. Seeking a political solution was the necessary element, as was training and improving the capabilities of TFG forces (through Ugandan, Ethiopian, or Tanzanian trainers). Farah questioned why the USG did not provide direct support to the TFG police and military, choosing instead to use third parties; Swan replied that the USG recognized the importance of improving TFG security forces but sought to have the AU and neighboring African governments play the leading role.

-----  
DAROOD APPOINTMENTS DISCOURAGE HAWIYE; 2009 ELECTIONS KEY  
-----

19. (C) On internal Somali political issues, Farah asserted that the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC) would finally proceed on July 15, albeit "slowly." Farah underscored his personal commitment to forming a viable Somali government, citing his three years of service as TFG PermRep, despite a recent USD 5 million bounty on his head by the CIC. Farah

ADDIS ABAB 00002185 003 OF 003

complained that the TFG leadership's inability to formulate policy was a "serious problem," citing power struggles among President Yusuf, Prime Minister Ghedi, and Parliamentary Speaker Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nurr. Yusuf's Majertain sub-clan and Marehan sub-clan members were struggling with each other in Kismayo, he added. Yusuf was likely too old to be a candidate for office in 2009, but had suggested extending the TFG's mandate beyond 2009. Citing the need for a multi-party system, Farah said such an extension would be "political suicide." PM Ghedi may seek to delay the current political process in order to position himself better for 2009 elections, Farah said. High illiteracy among MPs made it difficult to identify a suitable ministerial candidate from Parliament; the Transitional Federal Charter's requirement that cabinet ministers be selected from MPs also discouraged Somali professionals from the diaspora from participating in the TFG.

110. (C) Disproportionate appointments of members of President Yusuf's Darood clan discouraged the Hawiye clan, Farah said; the first five generals appointed were Darood, as were 21 of 34 ambassadorial appointments that would soon be announced (including key appointments to Addis Ababa, Washington, the League of Arab States, Brussels, and London). (NOTE: Farah said he was slated to transfer to South Africa, but that Ethiopian PM Meles and FM Seyoum had approached Yusuf about his remaining in Addis. The TFG would likely seek agreement soon for a Darod appointee to Washington, he added. END NOTE.) PM Ghedi was not supported by his own Hawiye clan, nor did he have the full confidence of President Yusuf. While pressure on the TFG had led to Hawiye being appointed as National Police Commander and as Governor of Benadir, they were former warlords, Farah said. Farah expressed appreciation for USG support of the TFG, as well as for pressure on the TFG to promote inclusiveness. Swan responded that failure to accommodate disaffected Hawiye, via the NRC or another mechanism, risked driving them to seek other alternatives, such as supporting Somali dissidents in Asmara or those condoning violent attacks.

¶11. (C) Farah noted that three distinct groups were united in their opposition to the TFG but were driven by different interests:

- Some Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr with business interests in illicit trade or occupied properties were "not interested at all" in the NRC or in establishing a Somali government.
- Others (including some in the Ayr sub-clan) had a genuine interest in power-sharing, and needed to be encouraged by the TFG. The Ayr community would be represented in power-sharing, Farah said.
- Former CIC leaders such as Adan Hashi Ayro and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys were extremists who supported Usama bin-Laden and Al-Qaida. The Somali people would not allow them to return to Somalia to form a political party, Farah said; instead, they would support their own clan leaders.

Farah agreed that the TFG would make little progress until it focused on engaging political leaders, rather than stressing the "social reconciliation" favored by PM Ghedi. A "sensible political program" needed to be discussed along with the NRC, to include a census and establishment of a national electoral commission for 2009 elections. Those who asserted they were alternatives to the TFG needed to campaign for that, Farah said.

¶12. (C) COMMENT. As Somalia's PermRep to the African Union (and Ambassador to Ethiopia), Amb. Farah has been one of the most visible proponents of the TFG, as well as of Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia. His frank comments on internal divisions within TFG leadership, and on the disproportionate nature of TFG appointments, echo those made in earlier meetings with USG officials (reftel). END COMMENT.

¶13. (U) AF DAS Swan cleared this cable.  
YAMAMOTO